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Nicolas Jacquemet nicolas.jacquemet[at]univ-paris1.fr |
Tél: + 33 (0) 1 44 07 83 66 Fax: + 33 (0) 1 44 07 82 47 Last update: Jan.
2010 |
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Current positionAssistant Professor (Maitre de
Conférences) at University Paris 1
Panthéon-Sorbonne (since 2006). Assistant
Professor (Professeur associé) at Paris School of Economics (since 2007). Research
fellow at Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (since 2006). 2005-2006 Post-Doctoral fellow
at CREST (INSEE, Paris). 2001-2005 Ph. D. in Economics, University of Lyon 2 (France) and Laval University (Qc, Canada). Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”, Experimental Economics, Vol. 10 (2), 2007, pp.187-188. |
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Publications | Books | Works in progress | Other outputs | Links |
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PublicationsFortin
B., Jacquemet N., Shearer B. Policy Analysis in the health-services
market: accounting for quality and quantity. Annales d’Economie
et de Statistiques, Forthcoming (current version: CIRPEE
WP n°08-07). Jacquemet N., Joule R-V., Luchini S., Shogren J.F. (2009) Earned Wealth, Engaged
Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction.
Economics Letters, Vol. 105
(1), pp. 36-38 (alternative
version: WP ; earlier
version: GREQAM WP
n°2008-13). Dumont E., Fortin B., Jacquemet N., Shearer B.
(2008) Physicians'
Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment. Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 27 (6), pp. 1436-1450 (alternative version: WP ; earlier versions: IZA DP n°3229 and CIRPEE WP n°07-45). Jacquemet
N., Rullière J-L. Vialle,
I. (2008) Monitoring
optimistic agents. Journal of Economic
Psychology, Vol. 29 (5), pp. 698-714 (alternative version: WP). Gabuthy
Y., Jacquemet N., Marchand N. (2008). Does Resorting to
Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence. European Economic
Review, Vol. 52 (2), pp. 259-282 (alternative
version: WP). Gabuthy
Y., Jacquemet N. (2007). Une évaluation
expérimentale des modes électroniques de résolution des litiges (in French). Revue Economique, Vol. 58 (6), pp. 1309-1330. Jacquemet
N., Rullière J-L., Vialle I. (2007) Contrôle des activités illégales en
présence d’un biais d’optimisme (in French). Revue Economique, Vol. 58 (3), pp. 555-564. Jacquemet N. (2006). Microéconomie
de la corruption (in French). Revue Française d’Economie, Vol. XX (4), pp. 118-159. |
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(all
in french) |
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Crépon B., Jacquemet N. Econométrie : Méthodes et
Applications. De Boeck Universités, Collection « Ouvertures », A paraitre. Ce manuel
offre une présentation complète et approfondie des techniques économétriques
les plus utilisées dans la pratique, allant du modèle linéaire et ses
extensions aux techniques non-linéaires de traitement des données discrètes
et censurées. Pour ce faire, les techniques présentées, et démontrées, sont
systématiquement illustrées par des exemples sur données réelles ou la présentation de travaux de
recherche consacrés à l'évaluation des politiques publiques (économie du
travail, économie industrielle, etc). Un certain nombre de chapitres est en
outre spécifiquement consacré aux outils d'évaluation des politiques
publiques: estimateurs par différence, méthodes de score. Le parti pris de
cet ouvrage est de mettre les problèmes d'identification au centre de la
démarche économétrique. Un accent particulier est donc mis sur le lien entre
la modélisation théorique, la spécification économétrique et la nature des
données. L'ouvrage
s'adresse ainsi non seulement à des étudiants de fin de premier cycle ou de
deuxième cycle en économie, gestion ou école de commerce, mais également aux
professionnels souhaitant approfondir leur connaissance des techniques
mobilisées dans l'utilisation de l'économétrie à des fins d'évaluation. |
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Gabuthy Y.,
Jacquemet N. (2009). Economie expérimentale et
droit, in Analyse
économique du droit, Deffains B. et E. Langlais (ed.), De Boeck Universités, Collection
« Ouvertures ». Langlais E., Gabuthy
Y., Jacquemet N. (2009) Analyse économique de la
criminalité, in Analyse
économique du droit, Deffains B. et E. Langlais (ed.), De Boeck Universités, Collection
« Ouvertures ». |
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Works in
progress Jacquemet
N., Joule R-V., Luchini S., Shogren J.F. (2009). Do people always pay less than they say? Testbed
laboratory experiments with IV and HG values. GREQAM
WP n°09-44, Submitted (part of this paper previously circulated as Do French students really bid sincerely?,
GREQAM WP n°2008-12). Jacquemet N.,
Joule R-V., Luchini S., Shogren J.F. (2010). Social psychology
and environmental economics: a new look at ex ante corrections of biased
preference evaluation. Submitted. Jacquemet N., Joule R-V., Luchini S., Shogren
J.F. (2010). Eliciting Preferences under Oath. Submitted (revised version
of CES WP n°09-43) Jacquemet
N. (2005). Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental
Evidence. Revised
in 2007 (Earlier
version: GATE
WP n°2005-06). Compensation, Incentives and
the Practice Patterns of Physicians: Theory and Evidence from Microdata. with B. Fortin and B.
Shearer. Abstract: In
this paper, we specify and estimate a structural model in order to analyse
the effect of various payment systems on physicians' practice behaviour both
at the extensive margin (hours and weeks of work, number of clinical
services) and the intensive margin (time spent per service). Our model also
distinguishes between clinical and non-clinical (e.g., management, teaching)
activities. To estimate the model, we exploit a unique data set containing
labour supply information and payment records for every specialist physician
working in the province of Quebec, Canada, during 1996-2002. Importantly, our
sample spans a period during which the government changed the way in which
specialists were paid. While before 1999, most specialists were paid under a
fee-for-service (FFS) system, the government introduced a non-mandatory mixed
remuneration (MR) scheme (i.e., a per diem plus a FFS system at a reduced rate) in 1999. Physician
preferences are described with a direct translog utility function and the
choice set of each physician is discretized. The model is estimated using a
mixed logit approach. Our results, applied to the sub-sample of surgeons,
indicate that those who choose the MR system reduce the volume of their
clinical services but increase their time spent per unit of service, which
may involve a quality/quantity substitution. Presented at Maurice Marchand Meeting in Health
Economics, 2004 (Lyon); CIRPEE Workshop on Applied Micro-Econometrics, 2005 (Québec); Econometric Evaluation of Public Policies,
ADRES Meeting, 2005 (Paris); Canadian Economics Association, Annual Meeting, 2006 (Montreal); 15th European Workshop on Econometrics and
Health Economics, 2006
(Thessalonique); European Economic Association,
Annual meeting 2006 (Vienne); Econometric Society, North American Winter Meeting 2007 (Chicago)
and Seminars at CREST (2005), Free University of Amsterdam (2006), University Paris-Dauphine (2009). The Reliability of the Bertrand
Curse: An Experimental Investigation of Leniency Programs for Underground
Work. with J-L. Rullière. Abstract: In
this paper, the demand for underground work of all producers competing on the
same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition
drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At
equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive
probability. Since this probability is strictly lower than one, this Bertrand curse
could account for the fact that models focusing on individual incentives to
evade overpredict evasion (often called the ``tax evasion puzzle''). We
thereafter assess whether denunciation could solve the Bertrand curse.
Allowing firms to denunciate competitors' evasion in fact provides a credible
threat against price cuts, hence fostering illegal work. As a result,
reducing the cost of denunciation through leniency clauses appears as an highly
counter-productive device against underground work. Empirical evidence from a
laboratory experiment confirms those predictions. Presented at Economic
Science Association, American meeting, 2005
(Tucson) ; Southern Economic Association, annual meeting, 2005
(Washington) ; Scientific Workshop on the Economic Effects of Envy (ENVY), 2005
(Budapest) ; Journées d’Economie Expérimentale, 2005 (Rennes) ; Société
Canadienne de Science Économique, Congrès annuel, 2006 (Montréal) ; Journées
de Micro-économie Appliquée, 2006 (Nantes) ; Economic
Science Association, International meeting, 2006 (Atlanta) ; Journées Louis-André
Gérard-Varet, 2006 (Marseille) ; IAREP-SABE, 2006 (Paris) ; Public Economic Theory, 2006 (Hanoi) ; ASSET, 2006 (Lisboa) ; European Association of Labor Economics,
annual meeting, 2006 (Prague) and Seminars at Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (2006)
University
of Nancy 2 (2006) and University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (2006). Marriage Matching
with collective labor supply with
J-M. Robin. Abstract: In this
paper, we integrate the recent developments in the analysis of household
labor supply into a search model of marriage. Following Shimer and Smith
(2000), matching on the marriage market is assumed time-intensive and, as in
the original model of Becker (1973), is driven by output from the match. We
explicitly introduce labor supply in the model by (i) linking the output from
the match to the productivities (wage) of the partners and (ii) assuming
collective labor supply inside the resulting household. Based on numerical
simulations, the theoretical analysis assesses whether the standard result of
positive assortative matching still holds when the output from the match is
both endogenous and non-transferable. We specify and estimate an econometric
model of search to test the predictions. The data we use come from the 1996
wave of the SIPP. By reconciling those two strands of literature, our model
accounts for some well-documented stylized facts on both marriage patterns -
such as the declining age gap between spouses, the rise in wage inequalities
inside households or changes in home production technologies - and recent
trends in the labor market - e.g. changes in female labour supply and gender
wage gap. Policy implications range from the economic consequences of, among
others, active policies aimed at sharing care responsibilities for children,
targeting social benefits on one spouse rather than the household as whole or
promoting female labour supply. Presented at Congrès annuel
de la Société Canadienne de Sciences Economiques, 2008
(Montebello) ; Annual
CIRPEE Workshop, 2008 (Mont-Orford). |
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Teaching (Current year only) |
In EnglishMaster 2 – Economie
Théorique et Empirique (University Paris 1 and Paris School of
Economics). Homepage. Experimental
economics (with Karine Van der Straeten). Graduate workshop in
microeconomics (with
Pierre Fleckinger
and Jean-Phillipe
Tropéano). |
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(Compact CV in pdf format can be downloaded here/ Version française ici). |
Current Position
Assistant Professor (Maitre de Conférences) at University Paris 1
Panthéon–Sorbonne. Assistant Professor (Professeur associé) at Paris
School of Economics. Research fellow at Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne. 2005 – 2006
Post-Doctoral fellow at CREST- LMI (INSEE, Paris). 2001 – 2005 Ph. D. in Economics, University Lyon 2 (Lyon, France) and Laval University (Québec, Canada). Title: Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships (in French). Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”, Experimental Economics, Vol. 10 (2), 2007, pp.187-188. Supervisors: B. Fortin (Laval University). J-L Rullière (University of Lyon 2). Thesis committee: B. Crépon (CREST-INSEE, Referee), P-Y. Geoffard (PSE-CNRS, Chairman), B. Shearer (Laval University), M-C. Villeval (GATE-CNRS), M. Willinger (University of Montpellier 1, Referee). 2002 – 2003 Doctoral Program in Economics, Laval University (Québec,
Canada). 2001
– 2005 Lecturer (Moniteur puis ATER), University
Lyon 2. M.A. (DEA)
in Applied Micro economics, University Lyon 2
(Lyon, France). Thesis’ title : Manipulating Internal Recruitment : Corruption in tournaments (in French). Supervisor: J-L Rullière. 1999
– 2000 Graduate of Ecole
Normale Supérieure (Agrégation du
second degré d’économie et gestion), ENS de Cachan
(Cachan, France). 1995 – 1999 Undergraduate
studies (D.E.U.G., Licence,
Maîtrise), University Lyon 2. |